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DISCLOSING CURRENT VALUES OF FIXED ASSETS
IN CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS
Mergers and some sales of assets involve transfers for value of
both securities and assets. When a corporation solicits shareholder
approval of such a reorganization, the proxy rules issued under regu-
lation 14A1 of the Securities Exchange Act of 19342 require the issuer
to disclose the current value of its stock, 3 so that the shareholders may
know the worth of the securities that they exchange. No regulation,
however, demands the presentation of current value figures for fixed
assets,4 and thus this data can be omitted unless required by rule 14a-
9,5 the general prohibition against the circulation of materially false
or misleading information in proxy statements." Under some circum-
stances the requirement of presenting material information mandates
the disclosure of fixed assets' current values. 7
1 17 C..R. §8 240.14a-I to -102 (1969).
2 15 U.S.C. §8 78a-hh (1964).
8 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101, item 14(c) (1969).
4 CMC Corp. v. Kern County Land Co., 290 F. Supp. 695, 696 (N.D. Cal. 1968).
'Tixed assets" include land, machinery, buildings, and equipment, which, in the normal
operation of a business, will not be exchanged for cash. See W. GR.AHAM & W. KAIz,
ACCOUNING IN LAW PRAcIcE § 128, at 215 (2d ed. 1938).
5 No solicitation subject to [regulation 14A] shall be made by means of any
proxy statement . .. containing any statement which, at the time and in the
light of the circumstances under which it is made, is false or misleading with
respect to any material fact, or which omits to state any material fact necessary
in order to make the statements therein not false or misleading .
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1969).
6 If proxies are not solicited, the issuer must send "information statements" to secu-
rity holders entitled to vote. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14c-1 to -101 (1969). Regulation 14C con-
tains an anti-fraud provision analogous to that found in 14A (17 C.F.R. § 240.14c-6 (1969)),
but no court has considered whether this provision authorizes a private right of action.
See Phillips & Shipman, An Analysis of the Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, 1964
Dunn L.J. 706, 794-95, suggesting that such a right exists. See also Laurenzano v. Ein-
bender, 264 F. Supp. 356, 261 (E.D.N.Y. 1966). Section 14(c) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, however, does not contain the phrase "for the protection of investors."
This phrase is found in § 14(a), and the Supreme Court relied heavily on it in finding
a private right of action in § 14(a). J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964).
Since a merger is a "purchase or sale" of securities within the meaning of § 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, a private party could probably invoke rule lOb-5
to provide a remedy for a material misrepresentation in an information statement. See
SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969). But the elements of a 10(b) action
may differ from those of a 14(a) action. Richland v. Crandall, 262 F. Supp. 538, 553 n.12
(S.D.N.Y. 1967); Coffey, Procedural Issues in Borak Cases, 2 REv. OF SEcumTms REGU-
LATION 969, 971 (1969). Although it may be more difficult to prove causation under
§ 14(a), scienter rather than negligence may be necessary to establish a violation of
§ 10(b). Id.
7 Unless the proxy statement states that the assets are actually worth the amount
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I
CumENr VALUEs CONSTITUTE MATERIAL
INFORMATION IN CERTAIN CASES
Investors ordinarily do not consider current values important.
Because the worth of fixed assets usually does not affect earning power,
it has little effect on the two most common sources of a shareholder's
return on investment, dividends and appreciation in market value of
his stock. But the proceeds from the sale of assets are another source
of return on investment, and the corporation's profit is determined by
the assets' current value.
If the merged entity intends to liquidate one of the merging cor-
porations, shareholders of that corporation will share the liquidation
proceeds with shareholders of the non-liquidated corporation. The
exchange ratio is unfair unless it compensates for the loss of profit.
Current values constitute material information here because they de-
termine the profits on the sale. Without this data shareholders in the
liquidated corporation cannot determine whether the offered exchange
ratio accurately reflects their loss of profits; the historical costs on the
balance sheet do not indicate the amount obtainable from liquida-
don.8
This analysis assumes that shareholders of the liquidated corpo-
ration are sharing profits that originally belonged to them alone. This
is true only if the liquidated corporation had a reasonable opportunity
to sell the assets and, absent the merger, would probably have done so.
Such a situation arose in Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc.,9 where the
liquidated corporation owned several real estate parcels. Serious in-
quiries by prospective purchasers of the land before the merger and a
poor earnings record suggested that the corporation would have sold
recorded, it technically would not be false, and it would not convey a half truth. Share-
holders would not receive an untrue impression of the properties' worth when only
historical costs are presented and when footnotes to the balance sheet state that assets
are recorded at cost. Even though the proxy statement is accurate on its face, however,
a material omission violates rule 14a-9 if it provokes a response contrary to that expected
from complete disclosure. See Note, Shareholders Derivative Suits Under Sections 10(b) "
14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act, 18 STAN. L. REv. 1339, 1348 (1966).
If the proxy suggests that the assets are worth the amount recorded, presenting only
the acquisition costs dearly misrepresents the properties' value. In a period of rising
prices and inflation, current values often exceed the cost of fixed assets less depredation.
L. DELLENBARGER, COMMON STOCK VALUATION IN INDUsmRIAL MERGERS 35-36 (1966); Memo-
randum for SEC as Amicus Curiae at 20, Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 66
(E.D.N.Y. 1969) [hereinafter cited as Memorandum].
8 Memorandum at 20.
9 298 F. Supp. 66 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
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the land had it not merged. The defendant 0 failed to disclose either
its intention to liquidate the corporation or the current values of the
assets, and the court held that defendant had violated rule 14a-9. 11
The court recognized the importance of both the opportunity to sell
and the probability that the opportunity would be utilized: "plain-
tiffs ... were prevented from exercising their right to decide whether
to gamble and speculate upon the profits to be received from the sale
of the remaining properties . . .
If the merged entity does not intend to liquidate one of the merg-
ing corporations, current values may still be material if a complete or
partial liquidation may reasonably be anticipated because there is a
ready market for the assets. As amicus curiae in Gamble-Skogmo, the
Securities and Exchange Commission favored disclosing current values
in such a situation.'3 The Commission did not rest its conclusion on
the possibility or probability of sale by the liquidated corporation,
14
10 It is unclear in what capacity defendant corporation was sued. It was both the
acquiring corporation and controlling shareholder of the disappearing corporation. The
court's statement that plaintiffs "seek a remedy primarily as sellers of . . . stock to
Skogmo" (id. at 96) suggests that defendant was sued as a party to the merger rather
than as the controlling shareholder of the disappearing corporation. But if defendant
was sued as acquiring corporation, rule 14a-9 seemingly would not subject it to liability;
that rule appears to limit the duty of circulating accurate proxies to the corporation
that solicits approval, which in this case would include only the disappearing corpora-
tion. Two theories, however, support the application of rule 14a-9 to the acquiring
corporation. Both corporations are involved in solicitation of shareholders of both com-
panies, especially when one enterprise is a majority shareholder of the other. Second, the
merged entity could be pictured as assuming the disappearing corporation's liability
under rule 14a-9.
11 Id. at 103-04. The court did not indicate whether both factors, failure to include
the appreciation and failure to disclose the intent to sell, were required in order to find
a violation of the rule. It did state that Gamble-Skogmo had a duty to disclose both
elements, but perhaps the court considered neither to be material unless both existed.
Although intent to liquidate would not be material unless the assets had appreciated in
value, since historical costs would represent their current values, appreciation alone may
be material. See text at notes 16-22 infra.
12 298 F. Supp. at 100.
13 Memorandum at 20. The Commission stated that although it was improper to
include current liquidating values in the financial statements of the proxy material, the
textual portion of the proxy should contain this data whenever complete or partial
liquidation was intended or could be reasonably anticipated. Id. at 19-20. Formerly the
SEC did not distinguish between placing current values in the financial statements of
the proxy statement and placing them in the text. It seemed opposed to the figures only
because the appraisal method was improper or because the appraiser did not follow the
method he claimed to have used. See cases cited note 60 infra. This new distinction prob-
ably came as quite a surprise to the directors of Gamble-Skogmo, especially since the
Commission probably would have deleted the current value figures had the directors
attempted to include them anywhere in the proxy statement. See note 66 infra.
14 See Memorandum at 19-20.
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and it apparently will insist that current values be disclosed even if
only the merged entity can liquidate the assets.' 5 Arguably, sharehold-
ers of the liquidated corporation lose no profits in this situation, since
none would have been received without the merger. But they contrib-
ute the assets to the merged entity, and they should be compensated
for this contribution, although not to the same extent as if the assets
would have been sold without the merger.16
The Commission's rationale demonstrates the importance of ana-
lyzing the value of the assets to the merged entity. If the properties are
valuable to the merged corporation because it can sell them, the liqui-
dated corporation has another bargaining tool even if it is unable to
dispose of the assets. For the same reason, current values are material
when a corporation replaces a division by merging with an enterprise
similar to the division: for example, when a car manufacturer replaces
its poorly-performing tire division by merging with a tire company.
Here the value of the other corporation's assets to the combined busi-
ness is their current value; 17 the merged entity may either purchase
new assets or acquire them through a merger.
Current values are material in mergers leading to liquidation or
replacement because the transaction is essentially a contribution of
property rather than earnings to the combined enterprise. But every
merger can be viewed as a contribution of properties by the corpora-
tions to the combined business,' 8 and disclosure of current values
should not be confined to liquidation and replacement situations. 9
15 The Commission stated that current values should be disclosed when "it is prac-
ticable to sell off [substantial portions of the] assets and still operate the remaining por-
tion of the business." Id. at 20. Presumably what is referred to is the practicality of the
merged entity's selling part of the properties while continuing to operate.
16 But cf. Sowards & Mofsky, Corporate Take-Over Bids: Gap in Federal Securities
Regulation, 41 ST. JOHNS L. REv. 499, 510-11 (1967), suggesting that liquidation values
are immaterial when the success of liquidation depends on the ability of the persons
undertaking the liquidation. When one party contributes the properties and the other
party contributes the ability to liquidate, however, both should share in the profits.
Absent disclosure of current values, the party donating the assets will not know if his
proper share of the profits is reflected in the exchange ratio.
17 In a replacement situation, the current value figures should equal replacement
costs less depreciation. See H. BABcocK, APPRAISAL PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES § 753, at
147-49 (1968).
18 See II J. BONBRIGHT, THE VALUATION OF PROPERTY 817, 819, 822 (1937); BABCOCK,
supra note 17, § 121.3, at 6.
19 One authority suggests that as a result of the SEC's position in Gamble-Skogmo,
directors may be required to disclose current values in every merger. Manne, Disclosure
of Asset Values, 2 REv. OF SECuRITES REGULATION 897, 900 (1969).
Under § 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(e) (Supp. 1969),
a raider may be under an obligation to disclose the current values of the target com-
pany. Under § 10(b), however, lack of insider status or of access to appraisals of
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Whether disclosure should be required in any particular merger is
quite another matter, since it involves the concept of materiality, a
concept without precise boundaries. 20 The problem can be partially
solved by requiring presentation of current values whenever the man-
agement of one corporation considers the current values of the other
corporation's assets in analyzing the desirability of the merger.
21 If
the target company's assets will negate the duty. Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc.,
266 F. Supp. 130, 132 n.2 (S.D.N.Y.), affd in part, rev'd in part, 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967);
Fleischer & Mundheim, Corporate Acquisition by Tender Offer, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 317,
330 (1967); Note, The Regulation of Corporate Tender Offers Under Federal Securities
Law: A New Challenge for Rule 10b-5, 33 U. CH. L. REV. 359, 373-74 (1966).
20 Note, supra note 19, at 364. The materiality of current values has been consid-
ered in only a few cases, and the courts have not responded consistently. For example,
in Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951), the court held that a
stock purchaser's failure to disclose the appreciated value of inventory was a material
omission under rule lOb-5 if the purchaser intended to merge, liquidate, or dissolve the
corporation. Id. at 828. See also III L. Loss, SEcutrrms REGULATION 1460 (1961). In con-
trast, the Gamble-Skogmo court focused only on the defendant's intent to liquidate the
acquired corporation. See note 11 supra. In extending the disclosure requirement to a
merger, the Speed court perhaps was considering a replacement situation; twice it stated
that the central issue was whether the defendant intended to "capture the inventory"
by merging, liquidating, or dissolving the corporation that owned the appreciated prop-
erties. 99 F. Supp. at 821, 828.
In CMC Corp. v. Kern County Land Co., 290 F. Supp. 695 (N.D. Cal. 1968), the
court held that an allegation that proxies did not reveal the appreciated value of assets
failed to state a cause of action under rule 14a-9. It indicated that plaintiff was re-
quired to show how the claimed difference between the value of the assets of his cor-
poration and the value of the stock received by him adversely affected his interests when
he retained some equity in those assets. Id. at 697. No such showing was required in
Gamble-Skogmo, however; the court found it sufficient that shareholders in the liqui-
dated corporation were forced to share profits that, but for the alleged deception, would
have belonged solely to them. This seems to be the correct approach. The distinction
between a complete loss of equity and a serious dilution of equity is relevant to the
question of the appropriate measure of damages but not to whether rule 14a-9 has been
violated. Once plaintiff establishes that the exchange ratio is unfair because it does not
compensate for the appreciation in value of the assets, he has proved that the failure
to include current values constitutes a material omission.
21 Cf. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 851 (2d Cir. 1968); Note, Rule 10
b-5: Elements of a Private Right of Action, 43 N.Y.U.L. REv. 541, 552-54 (1968).
Since directors must disclose those facts that reasonably could be considered material
(Richland v. Crandall, 262 F. Supp. 538, 553 (S.D.N.Y. 1967)), current values should be
disclosed even if directors initially consider these figures and then reject them as a basis
for establishing the exchange ratio. Their initial consideration suggests that current
values may be relevant, and the figures should be revealed so that security holders can
intelligently decide whether the directors made the correct choice. Otherwise, the share-
holders' vote is a "rubber stamp." Cf. Globus, Inc. v. Jaroff, 271 F. Supp. 378, 381 (S.D.N.Y.
1967); Note, Violations of Proxy Rules: Private Right of Action: Retrospective Relief:
JI. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), 50 CORNELL L.Q. 370, 373 (1965).
Unless another merger proposal is available, shareholders arguably suffer no loss if
the exchange ratio fails to compensate for current values; they are no worse off with
the merger at hand. The Gamble-Skogmo court, however, concluded that the omission
19701
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neither corporation considers current values, it is presumably im-
proper to use these figures in valuing either enterprise. 22 Thus, this
data will rarely be important if one corporation did not consider the
current values of the other corporation a "plus" factor when deter-
mining whether the merger would be advantageous. This standard of
disclosure may produce unsatisfactory results in a few cases, but the
certainty it provides seems to outweigh this deficiency.
II
ARGUMENTS AGAINST DISCLOSING CURRENT VALUES
A. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
One obstacle to disclosing current values of fixed assets is the
SEC's requirement that presentations of financial data in proxy state-
ments accord with "generally accepted accounting principles." 23 Re-
cording at cost rather than current value is an entrenched rule of
accounting,24 supported by at least two other accounting principles.
The principle of conservatism requires that an accountant faced with
a reasonable choice between presenting a company's financial condi-
tion in a favorable or in an unfavorable light choose the latter;
25 it
of current values would have been material even if the exchange ratio was fair. Gerstle
v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 66, 100 (E.D.N.Y. 1969). A better merger proposal
may be forthcoming from the same corporation if the first offer is rejected, and other pro-
posals may be made in the future. Shareholders should have the opportunity to decide
whether to accept a poor merger offer or wait, gambling that a better offer, one reflect-
ing current values, will arise in the future. See id.
22 A recent study of 33 mergers revealed that in one merger unrealized appreciation
influenced the merger terms. DELLENBARGER, supra note 7, at 21. Also, there is some in-
dication that replacement cost valuation, based on the market prices of items of similar
productive capacity, may be used in negotiating merger terms. Id. at 88-39.
23 SEC Accounting Series Release No. 4 (April 25, 1938), in 4 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
72,005. Some courts consider generally accepted accounting principles in determining
whether financial statements axe misleading. See, e.g., Richland v. Crandall, 262 F. Supp.
538, 557 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Corbett v. McClintic-Marshall Corp., 17 Del. Ch. 165, 175, 151
A. 218, 223 (1930).
24 Opinion of the Accounting Principles Board # 6, 17 (Oct. 1965), formerly Ac-
counting Research Bull. # 43, ch. 9, § B (1953); P. GRADY, INVENTORY OF GENERALLY
ACCEPTED ACCOUNTING PINCIPLES FOR BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 63 (1965). Some accountants
strongly oppose the principle on the ground that presenting only cost figures does not
fairly reflect an enterprise's financial condition. See H. BALDWIN, ACCOUNTING FOR VALUE
As WELL AS ORIGINAL COST 35-36 (1927).
In Richland v. Crandall, 262 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), the court held that failure
to disclose current values was not a material omission under rule 14a-9 and cited the
cost recording rule in support of its decision. Id. at 557.
25 S. SIMON, ACCOUNTING AND THE LAW 18 (1965).
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assures prospective investors that a company is at least as good as it pur-
ports to be.28 Where current value exceeds cost, conservatism dictates
reporting on the basis of cost. The principle of accurate income deter-
mination also supports recording at cost.27 "Writing-up" the fixed
assets to their current value may alter the earnings figures because fu-
ture depreciation expenses may be based on the written-up values
28
and because the write-up may produce an apparent increase in in-
come.29 Potential investors are interested in the earnings record of a
business as an indication of the efficiency with which invested funds
are used.
The rationale of cost recording assumes that financial statements
are used by purchasers of securities in making their investment deci-
sions; 30 the principle should not automatically apply to the financial
statements intended for sellers of securities. 31 To evaluate the offered
price or exchange ratio, shareholders whose companies are about to
merge may need to know the highest reasonable value of their busi-
ness's assets, not the lowest possible value. They may not be primarily
interested in how efficiently their funds have been used.
Another argument in support of cost recording is that it is neces-
sary to present financial information consistently. Otherwise, share-
holders cannot make meaningful comparisons of financial statements
from different years or ascertain the true progress of an enterprise.32
But when corporations are merging, shareholders may want to com-
pare the present worth of the properties of each company as well as
the development of each; both factors may be relevant in determining
the exchange ratio.
The accounting convention that revenue should be recognized
only when realized 33 also argues against using current values. Under
this convention an increase in the value of assets does not constitute
revenue because it does not entitle the enterprise to any cash or
credit.3 4 The rationale of this convention is the necessity for an or-
28 See id.
27 Hackney, Accounting Principles in Corporate Law, 30 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB.
791, 804-05 (1965).
28 See Accounting Research Bull. # 43, ch. 9, § B, 2 (1953), as amended, Opinion
of the Accounting Principles Board # 6, 17 (Oct. 1965).
29 See Randall v. Bailey, 288 N.Y. 280, 43 N.E2d 43 (1942).
30 Foster, Asset Disclosure For Stockholder Decisions, FINANCIAL ExECUTIVE, July
1967, at 33.
31 See III Loss, supra note 20, at 1456-57; Foster, supra note 30, at 33.
32 BALDWIN, supra note 24, at 35.




derly system of computing profits, 35 and computation of profits would
not be orderly if their measure changed as the assets' current values
fluctuated. But a proxy statement could disclose both cost and current
value figures without distorting the computation.3 6
The convention of indefinite existence of an enterprise also dis-
courages the disclosure of current values because it presumes liquida-
tion is not contemplated.37 Under this convention, the balance sheet
presents only unexpired costs that will be expensed against future rev-
enues.38 To the extent that a merger or sale of assets resembles a sale
or exchange,3 9 however, the assumption of indefinite existence is inap-
posite. At this point in a corporation's life, assets are not only unex-
pired costs to be depleted by the production process; they are also
articles of exchange that may be transferred for value.
40
B. Uncertainty
A second objection to the use of current values is that they are
necessarily uncertain. The objection rests on two grounds: (1) the dif-
ficulty of determining what type of value should be disclosed41 and
(2) the problem of obtaining an objectively verifiable figure for that
value.4
2
When liquidation is contemplated or can reasonably be expected,
current liquidation values should be used.43 Good faith offers from
third parties44 or appraisals conducted by qualified experts can pro-
35 Id.
36 This can easily be accomplished by preparing the balance sheet in the traditional
manner and enclosing the current values in parentheses next to each asset or group of
assets. Foster, supra note 30, at 42.
37 R. KENNEDY & S. MCMULLEN, FINANCIAL STATEMENTs: FORM, ANALYSIS, AND INTER-
PRETATION 435 (1962).
38 See Heller, Disclosure Requirements under Federal Securities Regulations, 16 Bus.
LAW. 300, 508-09 (1961).
39 Cf. SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 464-68 (1969), holding that a
merger is a "purchase or sale" of securities within the meaning of § 10(b) of the Secu-
rities Exchange Act of 1934.
40 Other assets, such as inventory, that are also exchanged for value are generally
recorded at the lower of cost or market. Accounting Research Bull. #43, ch. 4, state-
ment 5 (1953). The considerations applicable to inventory accounting, however, should
not control presentation of values in a merger situation. The purpose of inventory
accounting is to achieve "the proper matching of costs and revenues" (id. at ch. 4, 8),
while the purpose of merger accounting should be to inform shareholders of the highest
possible value that can be obtained from an exchange.
41 See I BONBRIGHT, supra note 18, at 10-39.
42 KENNEDY & MCMULLEN, supra note 37, at 96.
43 Memorandum at 29.
44 Id. at 21.
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vide sufficient accuracy.45 If one corporation desires a merger in order
to replace one of its divisions with the other merging enterprise, re-
placement cost less depreciation, defined as the market price the com-
bined enterprise would have to pay to acquire an identical item, pro-
vides an appropriate valuation. This method measures the value of the
property to the merged entity and can be applied to a wide variety of
assets. 46 Since a corporation will rarely be able to obtain identical as-
sets,47 however, it may be more realistic to define replacement cost
less depreciation as the cost of items of similar productive capacity.48
This method of valuation produces fairly objective figures.
The uncertainty inherent in the appraisal and replacement cost
methods of valuation can be decreased by using price level indices to
check the accuracy of the figures. 49 Also, assessed valuation by taxing
authorities can provide a lower level of reasonableness,50 and insured
value an upper level.51
When neither liquidation nor replacement is contemplated, but
the directors of either corporation believe current values may be im-
portant, the figures they use should be disclosed. Here the assets should
be valued in terms of their profit-producing potential to the merged
entity,52 but because each merged entity will integrate the properties
45 The Commission would allow disclosure of appraisals if they were conducted by
qualified experts and if they had a sufficient basis in fact. Id. at 24.
46 Even land can be valued by the replacement cost method. I BONBRIGHT, supra
note 18, at 169.
47 DELLENBARGER, supra note 7, at 37-38.
48 Id.
49 Manne, supra note 19, at 898. The Commission allows write-ups by foreign is-
suers if the tax system of the respective country permits revaluating, and if the write-
ups are based on price level indices set by the foreign government. L. RAPPAPORT, SEC
ACCOUNTING PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 26-12 (2d ed. 1963).
An accounting research study distinguishes between replacement cost valuation
and price level valuation, noting that the former is not a type of price level adjustment.
ACCOUNTING RESEARCH DIVISION OF THE AMERICAN INSITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUN-
TANTS, ACCOUNTING RESEARCH STUDY No. 6: REPORTING THE FINANCIAL EFFECTS OF PRICE-
LEVEL CHANGES 29 (1963) [hereinafter cited as ACCOUNTING RESEARCH STUDY No. 6]. Re-
placement cost valuation measures changes in the market price of goods while price level
adjustments reflect changes in the value of the dollar. Id. at 29, 169. If a general price
level index is used, the two methods will not necessarily give the same results. Id. at 29.
If, however, indices of specific commodities are used, replacement cost valuations produce
results similar to those produced by price level index adjustments. See id.
50 See Randall v. Bailey, 23 N.Y.S.2d 173, 186 (Sup. Ct. 1940), aff'd, 288 N.Y. 280,
43 N.E.2d 43 (1942).
51 See Foster, supra note 30, at 36. The fire insurance industry values property by
employing either the replacement cost less observed depreciation method or by conduct-
ing an appraisal. KENNEDY : MCMULLEN, supra note 37, at 96.
52 Ricciardi, Evaluating the Assets of Potential Acquisitions, in THE BUSINESS OF
ACqUISITIONS AND MERGERs 203 (G. Hutchison ed. 1968). Although it may seem that the
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of the merging corporations differently, it is difficult to formulate a
method of valuation applicable to all mergers. Using the directors'
figures is a reasonable alternative: if the valuation procedure is con-
ducted in good faith by a qualified expert, and if the resulting figures
are considered accurate by the directors, the figures should be dissemi-
nated to shareholders. There is no assurance of objectivity, but the
management presumably considered the figures valid.
C. Potentiality for Misleading Information
A third objection to using current values is that the data are po-
tentially misleading. Current values are only estimates of present
worth, and including this uncertain information may decrease the
ability of shareholders to intelligently evaluate a merger.5 3
If, however, current values are sufficiently determinable for di-
rectors' use, the figures should not lead shareholders astray.54 Even
though management may be more experienced in determining the
accuracy of estimates, their knowledge is not sufficiently superior to
deny shareholders access to this information. 55 If cost figures alone are
presented, shareholders have only a vague realization that the assets
might be worth more than the amount disclosed; if both costs and
current values are presented, even if the current values are somewhat
inaccurate,50 shareholders have the benefit of both accurate figures57
and some indication of present worth.58
replacement cost less depreciation method could appropriately be applied to any merger,
only in an actual replacement situation does this approach measure the value of the prop-
erties to the combined business. See II BONBRIOHT, supra note 18, at 819. But see note 22
supra.
53 See Memorandum at 24.
54 As a result of the Commission's suggestion that current values must be disclosed
when liquidation is not intended but can reasonably be anticipated (Memorandum at
20), this data might be material although neither the directors nor anyone else ascer-
tained the assets' present worth. In this case, of course, the argument that current value
figures are accurate enough for shareholders when directors examine them does not apply.
55 See id. at 25.
56 An accounting study considers current value figures based on price level indices to
be sufficiently safe for dissemination to investors. "[R]ecoguition of price-level changes in
financial statements is practical, and not misleading or dangerous to investors." Ac-
COUNTING R.s ascH STU-DY No. 6, at xi. But see id. at 252 (Comment of Robert C. Tyson).
The study suggested that indices known as the GNP Implicit Price Relators are
reliable enough for accounting purposes. Id. at 112.
57 Even the original cost figures may include a factor of judgment. I BONBrEGHT,
supra note 18, at 142-43.
58 Some data may be imprecise and yet may still be considered material. To be
material, information must only have a basis sufficient for reliance by a reasonable man.
And in the context of the disclosure policy, "speculators . . . are . . . 'reasonable'
investors entitled to the same legal protection afforded conservative traders." SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968) (footnote omitted). See id. at
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CONCLUSION
Although the arguments against presenting current values in
proxy statements have little merit, the SEC apparently accepts them.59
Despite its recommendations that this information be disclosed, the
Commission's Gamble-Skogmo memorandum as a whole evidences
serious apprehension about placing these items in proxy statements. 0
849 n.10. In that case, the court held that data obtained from a visual examination of
a spectacular copper drill core, which the court considered to be "generally reliable . . .
though less accurate than a chemical assay," were material. Id. at 852. However, in Sun-
ray DX Oil Co. v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 398 F.2d 447 (10th Cir. 1968), the court held
that information concerning the oil-producing capabilities of a field was not material;
although the tract "showed great probabilities," it had not attained the status of "proved
reserves," and hence the data were not required to be disclosed. Id. at 451. Although
these cases might be distinguished on the basis of both the potential of each exploration
and the relative reliability of the initial evaluations, their theories appear irreconcilable.
59 Memorandum at 9, 24.
60 Before the Gamble-Skogmo memorandum, write-ups were not officially forbidden
per se. See Barr & Koch, Accounting & the SEC, 28 GEo. WAsH. L. Rv. 176, 182 (1959);
19 SEC ANN. REP. 9, 21 (1953); 15 SEC ANN. REP'. 20, 21-28 (1949). The Commission ap-
peared to disallow write-ups only when the appraiser did not follow the method he
claimed to have used (Haddam Distillers Corp., 1 S.E.C. 37 (1934)), or when the appraisal
method was improper. Marquette Mines, Inc., 8 S.E.C. 172 (1940); Breeze Corps., 3 S.E.C.
709 (1938); Petersen Engine Co., 2 S.E.C. 893 (1937); American Terminals &c Transit Co.,
I S.E.C. 701 (19M6; La Muz Mining Corp., 1 S.E.C. 217 (1935); Unity Gold Corp., I S.E.C.
25 (1934). In practice, however, the SEC deleted current values in all cases in which this
issue was raised. Memorandum at 12.
In Gamble-Skogmo the SEC stated its position on write-ups in financial statements
as follows:
The Commission realizes that there are special situations in which some recog-
nition of increased appreciation of an asset's value should be reflected in a
financial statement. Indeed, the general prohibition against the practice of writ-
ing-up . . . assets . . . is, as a practical matter, limited to the common com-
mercial corporation with property consisting mainly of fixed assets whose current
value is not readily determinable. Accordingly, it should be noted that there are
two basic exceptions to the Commission's general prohibition against writing-up
assets in financial statements: those provided by statute or Commission rule and
those unusual factual situations in which specific authorization has been granted
by the Commission.
Id. at 13.
The most liberal interpretation of this quotation is that it is a restatement of the
Commission's previous theory as applied. By stating for the first time that there is a general
prohibition against write-ups, and by emphasizing that write-ups will be allowed only in
"unusual factual situations," however, the SEC may be suggesting a new, more restrictive
theory.
In addition, the Commission stated that the textual portion of the proxy statement
must disclose current liquidating values whenever a qualified expert makes the appraisal,
the appraisals have a factual basis, and "their omission would render the proxy state-
ment materially misleading." Id. at 25. Although the "materially misleading" rule might
suggest that disclosure will be required in a variety of situations, current liquidating
values seem material only in a liquidation situation. See text at note 43 supra.
Whether the SEC will permit the textual portion 6f the proxy statement to contain
current values in non-liquidation situations is doubtful. In Gamble-Skogmo the Com-
1970]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
The Commission's fears seem groundless. In the context of a merger
proposal, the management of each corporation desires to make the
plan appear attractive. This can be accomplished by' presenting the
financial status of their own company in its worst possible light, thus
inducing shareholders to give up their rights in what appears to be a
poor enterprise in exchange for less equity in a more promising busi-
ness. Because the potential for danger rests on an entirely different
ground when investors are encouraged to sell rather than to buy,61
the thrust of the disclosure policy should be reversed.62
Current values will not appear in proxy statements until the
Commission articulates a policy favorable to their disclosure. Con-
fronted with the limited approval currently accorded write-ups6 3 and
the vague admonitions of the regulations,6 4 directors are justifiably
reluctant to include items that have a perfect record of being deleted.65
mission noted that its experience with attempts to disclose current values had been un-
favorable, and there was no indication that it believed current value computations
would be more reliable in the future. Id. at 24. But see Manne, supra note 19, at 899,
suggesting that the Commission's position in Gamble-Skogmo indicates that it will more
readily allow the disclosure of current values in the future.
61 It should be noted that each of the previous instances in which the Commission
struck down revaluations occurred in the context of registration proceedings. See cases
cited note 60 supra. In this situation the policy against presenting current values stands
on firmer ground, since when stock is being issued the Commission seeks to prevent
unwarrantably high representations of the company's worth.
A similar problem arises when a tender offer is made. The target company's man-
agement may disclose current values to protect its own interest (cf. Cohen, Tender Of-
jers and Takeover -Bids, 23 Bus. LAW. 611, 616, (1968)), and one commentator suggests
that it should disclose the approximate market value per share of its assets. Note, supra
note 19, at 364-65. This raises the danger that the figures will be presented at an un-
warrantably high amount to discourage shareholders from accepting the offer. Cf.
Fleischer & Mundheim, supra note 19, at 360. Because the raider may not have access
to this information and because relying on the target company to provide the data may
be dangerous, the desirability of providing current values to shareholders faced with a
tender offer creates a dilemma. Aside from requiring the target company to allow the
raider access, an approach which will be unpalatable to the former, the only possible
solution is for the Commission to require the target company to disclose this informa-
tion and then to carefully scrutinize the data.
62 Foster, supra note 30, at 33.
63 Before Gamble-Skogmo the Commission indicated approval of disclosing current
values in only three cases. Memorandum at 26 & n.33.
64 The present regulations require only that the issuer present information in such
a manner as to "adequately reflect the financial position" of the company (17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-3 (1969)) and to present data "bearing upon the question of the fairness of the
consideration" when assets are sold (17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101, item 16(b) (1969)).
65 Although the SEC has never issued an absolute prohibition against disclosing
current values, in all cases before the Commission that raised this issue it eliminated
this information from financial statements. Memorandum at 12.
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CURRENT VALUES
Without a positive declaration,66 directors and the courts will wander
about in a morass, attempting to reconcile the disclosure requirements
of the SEC with the necessity of adequately informing shareholders.
67
Robert H. Scott, Jr.
66 A policy statement is necessary if only to counter a misinterpretation of a note
appended to rule 14a-9. There the Commission lists four examples of statements that
may be misleading, including "predictions as to specific future market values." The
example was designed to eliminate misleading information that was prevalent in proxy
contests (see 3 Stock Market Study (Corporate Proxy Contests), Hearings on S. 2045 Be-
fore the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking & Currency, 84th Cong., Ist Sess.
1569, 1575-76 (1955)), but some courts have construed it as an absolute prohibition against
including any uncertain or "prospective" financial information in any proxy statement.
See Walpert v. Bert, CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 92,165, at 96,765 (4th Cir. 1968); Miller v.
Steinbach, 268 F. Supp. 255, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). The staff of the SEC seems also to
have adopted this interpretation; in a meeting with Gamble-Skogmo representatives,
staff members indicated that the current values of the assets constituted prospective finan-
cial information and should not be disclosed in the proxy statements. Memorandum at
7-8.
The interpretation is incorrect, since the example was premised on the assumption
that in a proxy fight management would issue unrealistic revaluations hoping to con-
vince shareholders that the corporation was being managed efficiently and that they
should be retained. Thus it does not seem correct to assume that the example resulted
from a fear that management would revalue the assets as a means of persuading secu-
rity holders to trade them away. See Hearings, supra, at 1569, 1575-76.
67 The problem of reconciling the Commission's requirements with the desirability
of disclosing current values to shareholders arose in Norcan Oils Ltd. & Gridoil Free-
hold Leases Ltd. v. Fogler, 1965 Can. S. Ct. 36. Plaintiffs alleged that the proxy should
have disclosed revaluation figures of oil reserves; defendants contended that the SEC
prohibited releasing this information. The court avoided disagreeing with the Com-
mission by holding that the lower court had no power to vacate the merger. Id. at
44-45. The dissent argued that the omission of revaluation figures was misleading, since
it resulted in the presentation of a "dire picture" of the corporation and induced share-
holders to acquiesce in the merger proposal. Id. at 49. The lower court, which had up-
set the merger, also considered the omission misleading:
[I]f this valuation was taken into account shareholders' equity was at least nearly
$2,000,000 more than that disclosed in the balance sheet set out in the proxy
statement.
* * * If the valuation of the oil and gas properties of Gridoil was accurate,
that company had a surplus instead of a substantial deficit.
Fogler v. Norcan Oils Ltd. & Gridoil Freehold Leases Ltd., 43 D.L.R.2d 508, 509-10 (Sup.
Ct. Alberta 1964).
